In this paper, we analyze collision resistance of the JH hash function in the ideal primitive model. The JH hash function is one of the five SHA-3 candidates accepted for the final round of evaluation. The JH hash function uses a mode of operation based on a permutation, while its security has been elusive even in the random permutation model. One can find a collision for the JH compression function only with two backward queries to the basing primitive. However, the security is significantly enhanced in iteration. For 2, we prove that the JH hash function using an ideal -bit permutation and producing -bit outputs by truncation is collision resistant up to (2 2 ) queries. This bound implies the optimal collision resistance of the JH hash function in the random permutation model.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A S many hash functions, including those most common in practical applications, have started to exhibit serious security weaknesses [2] - [9] , the U.S. National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) has opened a public competition to develop a new cryptographic hash function. Currently, the final candidates to replace SHA-2 has been announced, which are BLAKE, Grøstl, JH, Keccak, and Skein. In this paper, we analyze collision resistance for the JH hash function in the ideal primitive model. The JH compression function is illustrated in Fig. 1 , where is a certain -bit permutation. The JH hash function is obtained by feeding the compression function to the Merkle-Damgård transform [10] . The only known result for the security of the JH hash function is its indifferentiability from a random oracle guaranteed up to query complexity [1] . This translates into the collision resistance of the JH hash function up to query complexity, which is far from optimal when the output size is greater than . Even if is a truly random function, one can find a collision for the JH compression function only with two backward queries to the basing primitive. In this paper, however, we show that the security is significantly enhanced in iteration. For , we prove that the JH hash function using an ideal -bit permutation and producing -bit outputs by truncation is collision resistant up to queries. This bound implies the optimal collision resistance of the JH hash function in the random permutation model. 
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. General Notation
For two bitstrings and , denotes the concatenation of and . Given for an even integer , and denote -bit strings such that .
B. Merkle-Damgård Transform
Let be an injective padding. With this padding scheme and a predetermined constant , the Merkle-Damgård transform produces a variable-input-length function from a fixed-input-length function . For such that , is computed as follows.
Function
Break into -bit blocks for to do return .
C. Collision Resistance
We review the definition of collision resistance in the information-theoretic model. Given a function and an information-theoretic adversary both with oracle access to an ideal primitive , the collision resistance of against is estimated by the following experiment. where The pictorial representation is given in Fig. 1 . For , let be the function that chops off the leftmost bits of its input string, i.e., if for some and . Then the -bit JH hash function is defined by . In the original submission, and . Since the padding is injective, we can simplify our collision analysis by assuming that the domain of the JH hash function is (and ignore the padding scheme). In the following section, we will prove collision resistance for the JH hash function assuming that is an ideal random permutation.
Experiment
IV. COLLISION RESISTANCE OF THE JH HASH FUNCTION
Suppose that an information-theoretic adversary adaptively makes forward or backward queries to an ideal random permutation , and records a query history . Here, and 's th query is either or for . We define a direct graph on where a direct edge from to labeled is added to when the th query-response pair determines an evaluation for some . We will denote such an edge by . We note that each query generates edges from to where .
Definition 1:
is called an orderly reachable node if there exists a direct path such that . By convention, is an orderly reachable node.
For
, let be the set of orderly reachable nodes determined by the first queries, and let be the event that contains a collision in the right-half bits. That is, there exist such that and Now our security proof consists of two steps. The first step is to prove that the probability of is small up to the birthday bound. The next step is to show that the probability of collision is small without the occurrence of . We begin with the following proposition. 
Proposition 2:
Suppose that an adversary makes queries to a random permutation and its inverse . For and ,
Proof:
Since (1) (where ), we will focus on the estimation of for . Note that contains at most nodes without the occurrence of event by Proposition 1.
Suppose that makes a forward query . Since there are at most one orderly reachable node such that , the th query determines at most one orderly reachable node . The probability that for some is at most . When makes a backward query , the probability that for some is also at most . Therefore, we conclude that Proof: Throughout the proof, we fix and bound the probability that the th query completes any of the configurations , , and without the occurrence of event . First, we suppose that the th query is backward. In order to make any configuration , should be contained in for some . This event occurs with probability at most since without the occurrence of event . Next, we suppose that the th query is forward. This query determines at most one orderly reachable node such that , and hence a unique node such that for some .
1) Event
: The probability that for a fixed is at most . Since , the probability that the th query completes without the occurrence of event is at most .
2) Event
: The probability that is at most .
3) Event
: The probability that for some is at most . To summarize, we have By Propositions 2 and 3, and inequality (2), we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1: For the -bit JH hash function ,
